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Rationality and Theistic Belief 
according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis­
tic beliefs might be made out. 
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis 
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is 
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser­
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not 
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge. 
( IO ] 
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My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the 
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to 
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In 
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on 
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I 
used a similar challenge to refute PT AS· The challenge to Plan­
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser 
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con­
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to 
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus­
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This 
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity 
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA 
and PT PI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre­
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3 
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed 
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi­
fication of theistic belief. 
I .  The Predictive Confirmation Challenge 
The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard 
Grigg, who writes: 
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Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast 
this morning is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e., as long 
as I have no reason for supposing that my memory is defective. But 
note that we can trust beliefs such as . . . [the paradigm beliefs] not 
only because we are unaware of defects in our experiential equip­
ment but also because we constantly have outside sources for confir­
mation of such beliefs. Indeed, is it not only through such outside 
sources that we can become aware of a defect in our equipment? For 
example, when I return home this evening, I will see some dirty 
dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigerator than was 
there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that . . . ["I had breakfast this 
morning"] is believed because of evidence. Rather, it is a basic belief 
grounded immediately in my memory. But one of the reasons that I 
can take such memory beliefs as properly basic is that my memory 
is almost always subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence. But 
this cannot be said for a belief about God, e. g., the belief that God 
created the world.' 
Grigg's argument, briefly stated, is that paradigm beliefs are 
properly basic because of some type of confirmation they have, 
whereas belief in God is not similarly confirmed. Since according 
to PT PI paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God are both properly 
basic, the lack of confirmation for beliefs about God proves the 
thesis false. That Grigg's confirmation challenge to Plantinga is re­
lated to the confirmation challenge to CP Alston considers is ob­
vious. The deliverances of CP are said not to have the kinds of 
confirmation that the deliverances of PP have, so, although PP's 
results are justified, CP's are not. As we know, Alston argues that 
the challenge is irrelevant to his claims. For the same reasons, the 
challenge is irrelevant to Plantinga's claims. 
Why should Grigg's disanalogy show that theistic beliefs are not 
properly basic? Grigg's assumption seems to be that properly basic 
beliefs are beliefs that are reliably produced by a mechanism or 
practice that generates beliefs about objects that are regular in a 
way that allows for predictions to be made about them. Thus, in­
sofar as Grigg's challenge rests on the belief that confirmation is 
necessary for reliability, his challenge falls prey to Alston's re­
sponse to similar confirmation challenges. The nature of the confir­
mation for which Grigg calls is not clear, however, and some clari-
r. Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality," p. 126. 
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fic�tory terminology and distinctions are in order. At one point 
Gngg seems to call for the confirmation of beliefs, as when he sug­
ge�ts that "I had breakfast this morning" is confirmed by there 
hem� �irty dish:s i?. the sink. At another point he seems to suggest that It IS the rehabihty (where, I take it, "reliability" refers to the 
tendency t� produce true beliefs) of the belief-generating practice 
�?at stands m �eed of confirmation. Grigg says, for example, that 
my memory IS almost always subsequently confirmed by empiri­
cal evidence. " It is convenient to call the confirmation of a prac­
tice's reliability the "validation" of a practice, reserving the term 
"confirmation" for the confirmation of the truth of a belief Con­
firming that a belief is in fact true, however, does not entail that it 
is pro�erly basic. But one clear feature of properly basic beliefs, 
accordmg to the challenge, is that their confirmation at least makes 
it likely that they are true and thus, perhaps, if not inferred from 
other beliefs, basic and properly so. 
A second point is simply that not every properly basic belief is 
confirmed, and thus confirmation of a given belief is not necessary 
for its proper basicality. Two issues come to mind. First, some 
beliefs, even when we try to confirm them, fail to be confirmed. 
Ne�ertheless, it does not follow that such beliefs fail to be properly 
basic. The memory belief that I took a walk by myself in the 
woods yesterday may not be confirmed because no one else saw 
me. My hiking boots show no evidence of the walk, I brought 
back no evidence of the walk from the woods, and so on. So, even 
though many memory beliefs are confirmed, some are not. Nev­
ertheless, such beliefs do not fail to be properly basic, at least on 
those grounds. The second issue deals with the simple fact that 
many beliefs are not confirmed because we have neither the time 
the interest, nor any special reason to do so. Generally speaking, I 
�o not concern myself with the confirmation of my memory be­
hefs unless there is some special reason to do so. I do not worry 
about :vhether I ate breakfast this morning, unless, for example, I 
am bemg asked by the physician just before she does surgery. If 
my memory seems vague on the topic, I might then try to confirm 
or disconfirm my memory belief. The failure of a given belief to be 
co�firmed surely does not entail that the belief fails to be properly 
basic. 
Two morals should be drawn here. First, the concern ought to 
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be not that each and every properly basic belief is confirmed but 
that, when, in general, one attempts to confirm certain kinds of 
belief, they are confirmed. There are, however, some exceptions to 
the rule. This brings to focus the second moral, that attention 
should be paid to the source of the belief to be confirmed-the 
epistemic practice-rather than to the belief alone. This brings 
Plantinga's and Alston's positions close together on the issues of 
confirmation and reliability. Some important relationships seem to 
hold between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of the 
practice that generates the beliefs. One of these relationships �ay 
be, for example, that, since many beliefs generated by a gtven 
practice are confirmed, the practice is validated. If this relationship' 
were to hold, then it might be enough for defense of Plantinga's 
theory against the confirmation challenge to show that, if the prac­
tice from which a belief comes is validated as reliable, then any 
belief generated by the practice, all other things being equal, can be 
legitimately taken to be properly basic. Here we find a potential 
explanation for the fact that we generally trust our beliefs even 
though not every belief can nor should be confirmed. But, as Al­
ston correctly notes, such an approach to showing a practice reli­
able is epistemically circular. Thus, talk about validation on 
Grigg's behalf is better recast in terms of the rationality of engag­
ing in such practices. More on this below. 
We cannot yet reply to the confirmation challenge. The nature 
of confirmation and validation remains unclear. How exactly 
are we to understand the challenge? We can take one clue from 
W. V. 0. Quine, who has taught us well that beliefs do not face 
the tribunal of experience alone. The web of our beliefs is complex 
in many ways, not the least of which is the very detailed set of 
confirming and disconfirming relationships that hold between one 
and another belief (or sets of beliefs) and between beliefs and expe­
rience. What I suggest here is that this web of belief and experience 
provides various understandings of the nature of confirmation 
from within, depending on the kind of belief one considers. To 
develop this point, we can concentrate initially on beliefs and expe­
riences having to do with the physical world, drawing out some 
implications of Alston's suggestion about the practices he calls b�­
sic. Recall that a basic practice is "one that constitutes our baste 
access to its subject matter. [For example, ] we can learn about our 
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physical environment only by perceiving it, by receiving reports of 
the perceptions of others, and by carrying out inferences from 
what we learn in these first two ways. We can not know anything 
a priori about these matters, nor do we have any other sort of 
experiential access to the physical world. "2 Alston's suggestion, in 
part at least, is that any judgment about the truth or falsity of a 
claim about the physical world (or the reliability or unreliability of 
a practice giving us information about the world) must be made 
within the epistemic practice that provides access to the physical 
world. There are, to be sure, some overlapping situations. For ex­
ample, memory might be partly but not wholly validated by what 
we learn from perception (a second practice) , even if the remaining 
parts involve appeal to memory. But the basic point stands: we 
think that paradigm beliefs have a link to something that makes 
them likely to be true only because we accept (pragmatically) the 
practices that generate them. It is only within the basic practices 
that we discover the nature of the physical world that gives the 
paradigm beliefs that confirming link. Alston goes further than this 
with his doxastic practice approach when he suggests that we 
should understand reliability through the notion of rationality. 
Compatible with this position is the suggestion that, because of 
the nature of the physical world and the epistemic practices we use 
to form beliefs about it, we take confirmation to be predictive in a 
certain way; we take it that, when we go about confirming the truth 
of a certain belief, we ought to look to see if certain other things 
are true. We expect certain features or facts about the world to 
become apparent to us as we continue to use the epistemic practice 
(and its many subpractices) that grants us access to the physical 
world. If, for example, I want to confirm that I see a tree, I look 
again or ask someone else to look. Similarly with nonperceptual 
practices. If I believe that I ate breakfast (a memory belief) and I 
wish to confirm it, I look to see if I left dirty dishes in the sink. 
Since physical objects do not normally disappear from view with­
out some reasonable explanation, and since my epistemic faculties 
are operating normally (as far as I can tell from within the prac­
tice) , I fully expect to find my beliefs about the world confirmed 
when I try to confirm them. Thus, as Alston suggests, PP is self-
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. I I7. 
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supported; it is then prima facie rational to engage in PP and, fur­
thermore, the rationality that attaches to engaging in PP extends 
beyond the kind that comes from the trivially supported type of 
self-support accruing to all epistemic practices. 
2. The Failure of the Predictive Confirmation 
Challenge 
Grigg's challenge, interpreted through the notion of basic pra�­
tices, comes to the following. Although many of the paradigm 
beliefs can be confirmed (and their corresponding practices vali­
dated) in a predictive way, theistic beliefs and practices cannot. 
Therefore, theistic beliefs cannot be properly basic. We have al­
ready seen, in Chapters 2 and 3, that this kind of predictive confir­
mation challenge fails, according to Alston, because of irrelevance. 
Alston's response to the fact that CP lacks confirmation whereas 
PP does not is that the perceptual world is regular, and on the basis 
of this regularity we can confirm and disconfirm our beliefs. The 
physical world and our access to it are predictable simply because 
the things about which we are seeking confirmation are regular 
and predictable. We do not, however, find the regularities in our 
access to God or his activities that we find in perceptual or mem­
ory experiences. The regularities in religious experience are absent 
not because of any fault in our epistemic faculties but because the 
object about which we seek information is not regular or predict­
able; God is not predictable. We can say, in summary, that theistic 
beliefs are not confirmed and the practice by which theistic beliefs 
are formed is not validated-not nontrivially self-supported-sim­
ply because the attempts at validation and confirmation depend on 
the regularity of the objects that the beliefs are purportedly 
about. 
This much we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. But the additional, posi­
tive claim Alston makes, which I have mentioned before but only 
briefly, is that if the confirming features were true of CP they 
would tend to show CP unreliable. Alston writes: "The reality CP 
claims to put us in touch with is conceived to be vastly different 
from the physical environment. Why should not the sorts of pro­
cedures required to put us in effective cognitive touch with this 
reality be equally different? Why suppose that the distinctive fea­
tures of PP set an appropriate standard for the cognitive approach 
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to God?"3 In other words, our access to God and information 
about him is different in an important way from our access to per­
ceptual objects. The object of the former lacks the regularity of the 
object of the latter. Whereas the breakfast dishes I put in the sink 
remain there, enabling me to perceive them (ceteris paribus) when 
I try to, God does not act in this predictable fashion. 4 We do not 
even know which features of things, if any, God typically uses to 
reveal himself. For all we know, there is no typical revelation of 
God. But there is an explanation for this lack of regularity: God's 
revelation of himself is not confined by the regularities of the natu­
ral order. The lack of regularity in our experience of God, then, is 
no reason to reject the reliability of the practice by which we some­
times form beliefs about him or his activities. In fact, if some of the 
things Christian's believe about God are true, then not only is pre­
dictive confirmation not necessary for the trustworthiness of the 
practice of forming theistic beliefs, but if we did discover great 
regularity in God's dealings with us we would have reason to dis­
trust the deliverances of the practice. 
Simply stated, then, the Alstonian reply is that the predictive 
confirmation challenge is irrelevant. An account of confirmation 
internal to one kind of practice cannot be relevantly applied to an­
other kind of practice. That theistic belief-forming practices do 
have predictive confirmation available for their deliverances should 
be no surprise. Let us consider an example that illustrates the reluc­
tance of theists themselves to appeal to predictive confirmation. 
The prayer of a Christian student that he score well on the medical 
school entrance examinations may not be answered affirmatively. 
Thus, a belief formed in the context of the prayer, for example, 
"God will help me do well on the exams, " would remain uncon­
firmed. In this case it is not that one cannot imagine what will 
confirm the belief but rather that one receives more or less direct 
disconfirmation. This in itself is not a problem for the notion of 
predictive confirmation of theistic beliefs, but it does point in the 
general direction of a rather telling fact about the way theists deal 
with confirmation. Many Christian theists specifically make al-
3 .  Ibid. , p. 128. 
4· There may be an object of the belief that remains regular. For example, in a 
case in which "God created the flower" is taken to confirm that "God created the 
world, " the flower is regular (parallel to the dishes) although God is not. On the 
analysis supplied, however, the latter irregularity is the real issue. 
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lowances for "unanswered" prayer. Hence they would admit that 
prayer-related beliefs such as "God will help me to score well on 
the examinations" often fall into one of two categories. They are 
either forthrightly disconfirmed (God does not act as the theist ex­
pects, as when the prospective medical student fails the entrance 
exams) or they are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed (at least 
immediately-perhaps God makes the student wait for years to 
take the exams) . In fact, the mature believer would say that such 
beliefs ought to be held with a great deal of tentativeness, if th�y 
are held at all. 
This does not mean that one could never receive confirmation of 
this type, 5 and many theists do take events in their lives as confir­
mation that God exists or that he wants them to do one thing 
rather than another. Nevertheless, it points out a certain reluctance 
on the part of theists "to put God to the test" or to be so pompous 
as to think that they have this kind of access to the mind or will of 
God. The central point is that, although one might receive confir­
mation of these specific beliefs on occasion, theists are reluctant to 
claim that such confirmation is readily available. The question to 
be asked is why theists make such allowances. The lesson to be 
learned is that theists understand that God's actions toward us are 
not always predictable, at least not in the same manner as natural 
phenomena. For all the importance of predictive confirmation in 
realms dealing with physical objects, it is clearly not as important 
to theists or to the practice by which they form beliefs about God. 
In short, basic practices can give us different, internal accounts of 
what confirmation should look like, and to apply the standards 
internal to one kind of practice to another is simply to apply an 
irrelevant standard. Perhaps, then, we should look for another 
kind of confirmation for theistic beliefs. 
3. Nonpredictive Confirmation 
I turn now to explore two examples, one theistic and one deal­
ing with a human person. My purpose is twofold. I note both 
5. As already noted, however, a great deal of such confirmation might tend to 
show the theistic belief practice unreliable. Still, one could receive such confirma­
tion on occasion without it affecting one's judgment of the practice's reliability. 
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differences and similarities between the two kinds of examples in 
terms of confirmation and epistemic justification. I also provide 
further grounds for my Alstonian observation that, although the 
theist might know what would confirm her theistic beliefs, she 
does not know when or if the confirmation will occur. The main 
implication of this observation is that there is a kind of nonpredic­
tive confirmation that, given the framework of basic practices de­
veloped by Alston, is exactly what one should expect given the 
nature of beliefs about individual persons and God. 
Grigg gives an example of a theistic belief that is unconfirmed, 
at least in terms of predictive confirmation: God created the world. 
How might one approach confirmation of such a belief? It cannot 
be done through predictive means, for the object of the belief­
God-is not predictable. So, for what kinds of things should one 
look? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, it might be 
enough for the provision of confirmation if there were some non­
theistic event or fact to which one has epistemic access; that is, it 
might be enough to confirm the belief that God created the world 
if we can discover some ordinary, nontheistic fact about the world. 
If this is enough, then one could have confirmation via a nontheis­
tic belief-forming practice such as one of the paradigm practices­
perception, for example. Take the mere existence of the world. 
After all, if God created the world, then the world must exist. And 
surely we can discover that the world exists. The second possibility 
is that we need some other theistic belief to provide confirmation. 
If this is the case, perhaps the practice through which one forms 
theistic beliefs must come into play. This, and thus that nonpredic­
tive confirmation for theistic beliefs is a possibility, is what I argue 
here. 
Return now to the first alternative. It perhaps provides some 
kind of confirmation. It seems, however, that if confirmation of 
theistic beliefs occurs through a nontheistic practice, the confirma­
tion provided is very weak. Consider this analogy. Suppose it is 
suggested that the belief "Kirsten created this sculpture" is con­
firmed by the fact that this sculpture exists. Now, although it is 
surely true that the creation of something entails the entity's exis­
tence (or at least entails that the thing exists for some time), the 
entity's existence seems to do little to confirm the belief needing 
confirmation. It is best described as a fact that is necessary to the 
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confirmation but not sufficient for confirmation. Thus, although 
the sculpture's existence can immediately be inferred from 
Kirsten's creating it, the discovery of the sculpture does little to­
ward confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture. The same 
seems to be true in the theistic case. If the existence of the sculpture 
were enough to provide confirmation for the belief that Kirsten 
created the sculpture, then the analogous theistic belief about God's 
having created the world would be confirmed by the existence of 
the world. But in neither case does the mere existence of the entoity 
in question confirm one's beliefs about its creator. What seems to 
be needed is an experience of, or belief about, the world (or the 
sculpture) that more strongly links it to its creator. 
We can now turn to the second possibility for confirming theis­
tic belief, in which another theistic belief is needed for the confir­
mation. Here I appeal, once again, to Alston's notion of a basic 
practice. Continuing with the sculpture analogy, what is needed to 
confirm that Kirsten created the sculpture is some information 
about the sculpture that more strongly links this sculpture to 
Kirsten's creative touch. What could this link be? 
Although many suggestions could be made, perhaps we can di­
vide the various options into three types. First, there could be 
some sort of uniquely identifying features of the sculpture that al­
low one to judge that it is indeed Kirsten's creation. One could be 
an expert on Kirsten's style, for example, and be able to recognize 
this piece as being in her style. Second, one could rely on the au­
thority of someone who knows that this sculpture is Kirsten's cre­
ation; perhaps an expert testifies to the claim or perhaps one is told 
by a friend that this sculpture comes from Kirsten's creative hand. 
Finally, perhaps the creator herself informs you that the sculpture 
comes from her hand; maybe Kirsten simply tells you that she 
made it. All these link this sculpture to Kirsten. 
Some observations about the sculpture example can provide in­
sight into the possibility of nonpredictive confirmation of theistic 
beliefs .  Parallel to the sculpture case, there seem to be three possi­
ble means of linking the theistic belief to be confirmed with the 
world created. First, one may be an expert on God's "style" and 
thus be able to recognize the world as being in that style. Second, 
one may be told (perhaps by one's parents or one's religious com­
munity) that the world was created by God. Third, one may be 
told by God that he created the world. 
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What do we learn from these three parallel pairs of possibilities? 
First, on the assumption that I am an expert and that I am paying 
attention and trying to see whether this sculpture did indeed come 
from Kirsten, I should be able to find features that (more or less) 
uniquely identify this sculpture as Kirsten's creation. But note that 
at some point I have to learn that this style is Kirsten's style. There 
is nothing at the phenomenological level that allows me to identify 
this object as the unique one that is the center of my concern. Nor 
is there anything that uniquely connects the object to another indi­
vidual qua that unique being. To return to the language developed 
earlier, one simply cannot develop conceptual-reading beliefs about 
such situations. There is always information in the background 
somewhere that has significant content about the individuals in­
volved. This information is held in the form of beliefs; more than 
just a conceptual scheme is needed. Thus, one does not link the 
unique features of some object to a unique person without at some 
point learning about the intimate connections between the two; 
and what is learned has substantial belief content. So it is with 
God's creative work, or at least one might suspect. One cannot 
know that this world was created by God through unique features 
of the world unless one follows through with a learning process 
that moves beyond a conceptual-reading level. 
The comparison indicates some disanalogies as well. There are 
two. First, what is the significance of "being an expert"? Are there 
any experts when it comes to recognizing God-touched features of 
the world?6 But a more important disanalogy is that there appear to 
be no uniquely identifying features of the world that link its cre­
ation and God's creative touch. Unless one claims that the world's 
apparent design is sufficient to conclude Christian theistic creation, 
I see little promise here. So, although there are some interesting 
parallels between the Kirsten case and the case of God in terms of 
where one might look for confirmation (both involve background 
content beliefs) , there is an important difference in that when it 
comes to God's creation of the world there appear to be no unique 
features of the world that can be attributed only to God (or least 
none to which we have epistemic access) . Why the God and Father 
of Jesus Christ, for example, instead of Krishna? 
6. It might be interesting here to look closely at how difficult it is to become an 
art expert and the interesting phenomena surrounding forgeries in the art world. 
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I suggest that in fact this disanalogy teaches us something im­
portant about CP. I have already noted (Chapter 8, Section I )  that 
CP needs Christian* beliefs to generate religious beliefs with spe­
cifically Christian content. I argued that these background beliefs 
need justification. Where are they to be found? My argument is 
that such a demand leads to either an infinite regress of justification 
or natural theology (or other inferential reasoning) with a Christian 
result. Neither of these is felicitous for the Reformed epistemolo­
gists. But there is another possibility that I considered briefly 
(Chapter 7, Section 6): a theistic, nonlawlike externalism. 
This kind of externalism is not lawlike in that its working in us 
is not natural (in a sense that allows for predictive possibilities) but 
supernatural. It depends on God's inclining himself toward us and 
not on some lawlike mechanism. It is rather like the reliabilism 
Alston rejects in arguing that justification is not simply reliability 
but has, rather, a reliability constraint. He says that it may be that 
accurate weather predictions simply pop into my head-but I have 
no access to their source even though they are reliable. Rather like 
that, perhaps God simply pops things into the theist's head. Let us 
call this "theistic reliabilism. " But would this reliable source of be­
lief provide the kind of justification required for Christian* beliefs? 
Certainly not on Alston's account of justification, for theistic re­
liabilism has no internal access as Alston requires. What about ac­
cording to Plantinga's view? Insofar as one is impelled to believe 
these God-inspired beliefs (and one has met whatever normative 
requirements there are) , they would meet Plantinga's criteria for 
justification or proper basicality. But that is just to raise an impor­
tant question about the extraordinarily weak notion of justification 
in which Plantinga's account of proper basicality is embedded. 
Why should we take such beliefs to be justified, even prima facie? 
Alston seems to have the happier account of justification here, and 
once again, the theistic reliabilism I have suggested does not spec­
ify an internalist constraint. 
Why not add one? The answer is that, unlike other reliable prac­
tices in which one can return again to the practice for "retesting, " it 
is not clear that one can do so with CP. The account of God pro­
vided by CP is one of a deity who hides himself. One can have a 
religious experience and never have another by which to test the 
first. At least with the human case-Kirsten and her sculpture-
Confirmation and Theism [ I 9 5 
one can check the features of Kirsten's style, or check with Kirsten 
herself, or ask other experts. In the religious case, can these other 
approaches be used to check earlier experiences? Perhaps, but an­
other problem arises here. 
Recall my distinction between CP and religious practice. Al­
though it is true that many, if not most, Christian believers have a 
large number of religious experiences, they must learn to take 
these as Christian experiences since nothing in the phenomenon of 
the experience is explicitly Christian. What is the source of the 
Christian content? This brings us to the second possibility noted 
above, my being told by my parents that God created the world. Is 
this really parallel to my being told by a friend that this is Kirsten's 
sculpture? In the case of the sculpture there are other means of 
checking the story. I can appeal to features of the sculpture that 
pick it out as Kirsten's or I can ask Kirsten. 7 Can I ask God? Per­
haps, but asking does not imply receiving a reply. Of course, the 
same is true for Kirsten; she does not have to grace us with a reply 
either. And here we learn something of value. The access we have 
to information about persons qua unique individuals depends in an 
important way on the self-revelation of the person involved or on 
information given to us by others. Let me expand on this. 
Just as I must learn from someone to take the markings on the 
sculpture to be in Kirsten's style, thus connecting this sculpture to 
Kirsten, so I must learn to take religious experiences to be Chris­
tian. Where do we learn such things? Barring prophets and the 
founder of Christianity, we learn the set of Christian beliefs, sym­
bols, and concepts from our parents, the broader Christian com­
munity, and, more generally, the entire tradition-its history, 
myths, and scriptures. Here what Reid calls-and the Reformed 
epistemologists call attention to-the "credulity disposition" is im­
portant. We all have a natural disposition to trust what others tell 
us. This disposition is modified as we mature as epistemic agents. 
We learn not to trust certain people, or not to trust them on certain 
issues. This disposition, I suggest, is important in the formation of 
Christian beliefs (as well as those of competing traditions such as 
7· The former approach seems ruled out in the God case, for there may be no 
unique features to which I can appeal as evidence that this world was indeed cre­
ated by God. 
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Buddhism or Hinduism). In fact for most of us-once again bar­
ring prophets and religious visionaries-this is the sole source of 
our Christian framework of beliefs and concepts. But one of the 
things we learn as we mature epistemically is that, although much 
of what we learn through the credulity disposition is true, when it 
is crucial we should check the claims of others ourselves. 
Is it crucial to do so for the Christian tradition? It appears so, for 
the tradition is in competition with others as it claims exclusive 
truth for its central beliefs. And unlike other epistemic practices 
that are conceptual-reading practices, CP is not-it is completely 
self-contained in its belief content. By "completely self-contained" I 
mean that, for those in the tradition whose sole source of that be­
lief content is the authority of others, we must either find some 
means of checking our employment of the credulity disposition or 
recognize the rather radical circularity of our Christian world view. 
The former seems unlikely, for the only people who seem to have 
access to Christian truth by some means other than the word of 
other Christiaas are the prophets and founders. This brings us to 
the third possibility suggested above, that I am, or some human is, 
told by God that he created the world. But just how would God 
communicate such a thing? Scripture tells us, but that is little if any 
better than being told by a friend. And prophets are the source of 
Scripture. Furthermore, information we have about the prophets is 
largely internal to the tradition, its scriptures, and its authority; 
once again we must rely on the credulity disposition. Even if we 
could ask Jesus himself-and what better source than him to ask­
if he is the Son of God, would we not have to take his word for it? 
Not even his miracles take us from this-worldly events to theo­
logically laden beliefs. Although they are certainly surprising, all 
historical research can give us that they happened. What history 
does not give us is why they happened, and in particular that they 
happened at the hand of God. So this route seems unpromising­
unless, perhaps, one wants to return to natural theology. But even 
here it seems that we cannot get explicitly Christian results but at 
best only a rather generic theism. 
What of the other option-recognizing the rather radical circu­
larity of the Christian world view? This is the position I believe we 
should take, but not without noting the fact that such circularity 
has been thought by many to provide justification for the beliefs 
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the circle contains. This is a holistic kind of justification, or a t  least 
a justification with a strong holistic component. This should not, I 
think, be a surprise, for when I presented the account of exagger­
ated CP above I in effect greatly loosened the justificatory connec­
tion between the experiences that are the occasion for the genera­
tion of theistic beliefs and the resulting theistic beliefs. This is an 
important claim of the holist: experience is the genesis of belief but 
is not needed for justification. This distancing of justification from 
experience is no less true for CP. Although there is a religious 
experience at the bottom of CP, the generation and justification of 
the explicitly Christian reading of that experience depends wholly 
on other Christian beliefs. I have more to say on this below. 
Now, this all seems parallel to cases of linking individual hu­
mans to their activities. It seems clear enough that the belief or 
experience needed for confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture 
is one that makes reference to Kirsten. It is not sufficient to know 
some "bare" fact about the sculpture, that is, a fact that stands free 
of some attribution of Kirsten's activity or even, for that matter, 
the fact that some person created it. So it seems with the belief that 
God created the world. If the world's existence is to be understood 
to confirm the belief that God created the world, there must be 
some information that links the world to God besides the original 
belief. There must be some means of access to further theistic data 
for the confirmation of theistic beliefs to occur. And this is, I sug­
gest, just where the holist justification, with its reliance on the cre­
dulity disposition, comes into play. 
The theist may be quite willing to suggest that she does have 
access to further theistic data. The theist may receive confirmation, 
on occasion, that God created the world. The predictive confirma­
tion challenger can point out, however, that this access fails to 
have an important feature. The access to theistic data needed for 
confirmation does not, unlike the access to ordinary perceptual ob­
jects, allow for predictive confirmation. Why? Because whatever ac­
cess one has to the needed information-information that has a 
theistic component-relies on God's revealing himself or his activ­
ity. When trying to confirm that it is the desk in my office that had 
ink spilled on it, I can put myself (typically) in a position to con­
firm it by looking (again) to see if the ink stain is still there. But I 
cannot put myself in a position for God to speak to me and be in 
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the least guaranteed that he will. Although one can predict what 
event would confirm a theistic belief (e. g. , God's telling us he did 
something) , one cannot predict the occurrence of the event. Its oc­
currence relies on God's action, to which we have no predictive 
access. In summary, with perceptual beliefs and PP there appear to 
be (under many if not most circumstances) means by which we can 
predict the occurrence of happenings or events that would confirm 
the belief in question. Although sometimes these predictions fail, 
generally they do not. We believe this because the predictions" rely 
on a certain understanding of the physical world and the epistemic 
practice through which we have access to that world. This under­
standing is internal to the set of beliefs we have about the world, 
the experiences we have of the world, and the practice through 
which these two are connected. Furthermore, the perceptual epi­
stemic practice can become internally validated through repeated 
confirmations, allowing us generally to trust the practice as reli­
able. With theistic beliefs the case is different. We can say what 
(theistic) facts or events might provide confirmation, but we can­
not say ahead of time when (or even if) we will have access to 
them; we cannot predict their occurrence. I suggest that the prac­
tices through which we have access to God, through which we 
form theistic beliefs, do not give an understanding of God that 
provides for predictive confirmation-and that is precisely as it 
should be. The same is true, however, for belief-forming practices 
that provide us with beliefs about epistemically unique, spatiotem­
porally nonrooted individuals, especially those with free will. 
There is no epistemic access to such individuals apart from the 
practice that generates beliefs about them. One must always turn 
to the same practice (or subpractices) to confirm the belief in ques­
tion. And with these practices there is no predictive element. The 
objects of the beliefs are unpredictable, just as God is. 
To complete the discussion of our examples, one further issue 
needs consideration. There is a sense in which any person holding 
the belief "God created the world" has access to the information 
needed to confirm theistic beliefs. For example, it follows imme­
diately from the fact that God is the creator-sustainer of the world 
that God created the flowers, the hills, the trees. It might be sug­
gested that these (theistic) beliefs provide the needed confirmation. 
I believe this suggestion does not suffice, for this "access" is not 
really access and therefore does not provide an interesting kind of 
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confirmation. Grigg speaks of the confirmation being "outside. " 
Although it is less than fully clear what Grigg means by outside 
confirmation, it surely should not include confirmation by beliefs 
whose truth is known simply by an immediate, one-step inference 
from the belief needing confirmation. 
The problem can be seen by exploring the following case. Con­
sider meteorologist Smith who, after research, forms the belief p 
that sundogs can be seen whenever conditions C are met. As she 
continues her research, Smith discovers that conditions C are, in 
fact, about to occur. To confirm her belief, she predicts that at 
time t and location 1 a sundog will appear. Those conditions come 
about, the sundog appears, and Smith has confirmation of p. Now 
Smith holds the belief that sundogs appear under certain condi­
tions. Were she merely to infer that a sundog did in fact appear 
under those conditions, without the corresponding experience, she 
would not have truly confirmed her belie£ Armchair science is ruled 
out. Likewise, without some further data beyond the theistic belief 
"God created the world, " confirmation seems unlikely. The confirm­
ing information must be generated from an "outside" source. 
This raises the important issue: what exactly is the appropriate 
sense of "outside"? I do not think I can provide a full answer to this 
question. Two things can be noted, however. First, I have already 
suggested that to be outside is to extend beyond immediate infer­
ences from the belief to be confirmed, beyond what can be done in 
the armchair. Second, in some ways confirmation is always "in­
side. " This is where Alston's notion of basic practices, the notion 
of epistemically circular reasons, Alston's larger doxastic practice 
approach to epistemology, and the possibility of holistic justifica­
tion come into play. The sculpture analogy is a case in point. What 
confirms the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture is an aware­
ness of a further fact connecting the sculpture to Kirsten's creative 
work. The information needed for confirmation must make refer­
ence to or contain at least some of the members of the very set of 
notions contained in the belief being confirmed. A belief about 
Kirsten must be confirmed by some further information about 
Kirsten; a belief about God must be confirmed by further informa­
tion about God. 8 
8. It is not clear that one can draw a hard and fast conclusion on this point. For 
example, the confirmation in the breakfast case does not directly rely on the notion 
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A somewhat different although related point is that I have access 
to this connecting information by Kirsten telling me, someone else 
telling me, or some feature "telling" me that Kirsten did indeed 
make the sculpture. The source of the confirming data is, presuma­
bly, the same source as (or a source closely allied with) the source 
from which I derived my original belief. Otherwise the content of 
the data is not likely to be immediately related. It seems true that 
there are only a limited number of means through which one has 
access to the needed information and also true that certain kinds of 
information can be discovered only by certain kinds of approach. 
This is in part the point of Alston's suggestion that beliefs about 
physical objects are formed through a basic practice. My claim is 
that I came to hold the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture via 
a belief-forming practice that relies on someone telling me 
(whether Kirsten or someone else) or recognizing that the sculp­
ture is one of Kirsten's and that any confirmation I come by is not 
outside these practices (or closely related practices) and their related 
beliefs and experiences. 
The lesson I wish to draw from these observations is that it ap­
pears that confirmation is circular in two senses. First, confirma­
tion seems to rely on the fact that the confirmation available for a 
given belief must typically appeal to the epistemic practices and 
related beliefs and experiences that formed the original belief need­
ing confirmation. Thus, if there is a link between confirmation and 
validation, one might begin to suspect that it is somewhat circular. 
Such confirmation and validation are not "outside" in any absolute 
sense. Second, confirmation is circular, since even how it should be 
conceived is dependent on the practice and the nature of the objects 
about which the practice provides us beliefs. For practices dealing 
with regular predictive things, confirmation should be predictive. 
For those not dealing with predictive things, confirmation should 
not be predictive. Accordingly, if confirmation is to have an epi­
stemic role, one should suspect that that role has a large holistic 
component, especially where a noninferential mediated practice is 
at stake.9 
of breakfast. It  does, however, seem to rely indirectly on the notion: there is  one 
less egg in the refrigerator because I ate it for breakfast. 
9. A general note on this chapter. Alston makes the point, in Perceiving God, pp. 
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I have suggested that confirmation is a holistic notion, or at leas
t 
that it has strong holist components. In the next c�apt�r I sug.g
est a 
new parity thesis and defend it against two potenttal dt�ficultte� 
.. In 
the final chapter I flesh out certain aspects of the hohst postt
ton 
needed for the new thesis . 
2 1 1_ 12 as does Peter Losin in "Experience of God and the P
rinciple of C�edulity: 
A Repiy to Rowe," Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 59�70, that the. ch�c
kmg pr�­




agreement with mine in this chapter, except that n.
erther of them pushes t�e hohst 
line 1 do. p p  has its confirmation and appeals to rtse�f for that confirma�
ron. CP 
likewise has its confirmation (albeit of a different stnpe) an
d appeals to Itself for 
that confirmation. 
